Marco Espinosa-Cortez v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2010 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-2-2010 
Marco Espinosa-Cortez v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010 
Recommended Citation 
"Marco Espinosa-Cortez v. Atty Gen USA" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 1078. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/1078 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 08-4170
_____________
MARCO TULIO ESPINOSA-CORTEZ, 
LUZ MARINO LOPEZ-TIBADUIZA, &
XIMENA DEL PILAR ESPINOSA-LOPEZ, 
Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency Case Numbers A98-542-368, 
A98-542-369, A98-543-097)
Argued March 24, 2010
Before: RENDELL, AMBRO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
-2-
(Opinion Filed: June 2, 2010)
Peter M. Rogers, Esq. [ARGUED]
Rogers & Rogers, P.C.
437 Grand Street
Suite 1806
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Petitioners
Dalin R. Holyoak, Esq. [ARGUED]
Kristen Giuffreda Chapman, Esq.
Regina Byrd, Esq.
Francis W. Fraser, I, Esq.
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
Counsel for Respondent
OPINION OF THE COURT
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
  There are two petitions under review in this1
matter—that of Espinosa-Cortez (which includes his wife as a
derivative claimant) and that of his adult daughter, Ximena. 
The petitions arise out of the same set of facts, which center
around Espinosa-Cortez’s social and business activities and his
connections to the Colombian military and government.  For the
sake of simplicity, we refer to Petitioners collectively as
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Marco Tulio Espinosa-Cortez, his wife, Luz, and his
adult daughter, Ximena, are natives and citizens of Colombia.
Between 2002 and 2003, the Espinosa-Cortez family was
repeatedly threatened by agents of the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (“FARC”) in an effort to coerce
Espinosa-Cortez, who had close connections to the Colombian
government and military, into becoming a FARC informant.
Once it became clear that the Colombian government would not
take steps to protect his family, Espinosa-Cortez liquidated his
assets, fled with his family to the United States, and applied for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  The immigration judge
(“IJ”) denied his application, and the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed, concluding that Espinosa-Cortez had
not shown that he would be persecuted on account of actual or
imputed political beliefs if he were removed to Colombia.  
Espinosa-Cortez seeks review on one issue—whether
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that
Espinosa-Cortez lacks a reasonable fear that he would be
persecuted on account of his actual or imputed political beliefs
if he were to return to Colombia.   Although we review the1
“Espinosa-Cortez,” except where it is necessary to identify them
individually.  
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BIA’s decision under a highly deferential standard, we conclude
that the BIA’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence,
and we will grant the petition for review.  
I.
A.
We begin by reviewing Espinosa-Cortez’s testimony.  We
note at the outset that the IJ found the majority of Espinosa-
Cortez’s testimony credible, and unless otherwise noted, the
testimony we review below was found credible.  
Espinosa-Cortez’s troubles with the FARC trace back to
1984, when a vehicle he was driving was ambushed and he was
kidnapped.  Espinosa-Cortez was held captive by the FARC for
approximately one month until a ransom was paid to secure his
release.  Espinosa-Cortez conceded during his testimony that the
1984 kidnapping was motivated by his wealth, not his political
beliefs; indeed, he was not politically active in any meaningful
way in 1984.  After the kidnapping, however, and as a result of
his dislike for the FARC, he became increasingly active in
Liberal Party politics, giving money to various Liberal Party
candidates and participating in a variety of political campaigns.
According to Espinosa-Cortez’s testimony, these campaigns
would frequently receive generalized threats from the FARC,
although he personally received no direct threats from the FARC
while participating in the campaigns.  Espinosa-Cortez did not
testify in significant detail as to his participation in Liberal Party
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politics, mentioning it only in passing during his direct
testimony.  The IJ did not find his testimony concerning “the
degree of his political activity” to be credible in light of the fact
that he “mentioned his political participation only incidentally.”
(App. at 75.)  
In addition to his direct participation in political
campaigns, Espinosa-Cortez had wide-ranging connections with
the Colombian military and government as a result of his social
and business activities.  Espinosa-Cortez had long participated
in equestrian events in Colombia and was a member of the
Federal Equestrian Board; Espinosa-Cortez testified that he and
his wife would attend equestrian events every weekend, where
they would socialize with government ministers and high-
ranking military personnel.  
More importantly for purposes of Petitioners’ asylum
claims, Espinosa-Cortez also developed relationships with
governmental and military figures through his business
activities.  In particular, Espinosa-Cortez owned a catering
business that supplied food to governmental and military
institutions, and he owned a store within the military academy
that sold food to cadets.  Through his work as a food supplier,
Espinosa-Cortez, his family, and his employees had “free
access” to the military academy at all hours, (App. at 138); that
is, as a food supplier to government and military institutions,
Espinosa-Cortez and his family had ready access to, and
frequently worked in, those institutions.  
Between 2002 and 2003, Espinosa-Cortez received a
  The IJ expressly stated that she found Espinosa-2
Cortez’s testimony “with respect to the FARC’s pursuit of him
to become their informant” to be credible.  (App. at 74.)  
  The transcript of the immigration proceedings is replete3
with errors, and numerous words of the testimony are simply
labeled “indiscernible.”  Petitioners complained during the
proceedings that Espinosa-Cortez’s testimony was being poorly
translated, and they raised this issue (as well as a concern over
the inadequacy of the transcript) on appeal before the BIA, but
they do not raise it here.  
-6-
series of threatening telephone calls from the FARC.   When he2
received the first such call, he thought that the caller was
playing a prank on him, but the FARC agent informed him that
he was not joking and that the FARC wanted his help.  The
caller promised to get back in touch with him and hung up.  In
November 2002, the FARC agent called back and demanded,
first, that Espinosa-Cortez act as an informant for the FARC
and, second, that he cease providing food and other services to
the army.  The caller stated that Espinosa-Cortez’s wife and
daughter would be killed if he did not assist the FARC; the
caller described Ximena’s daily routine in detail, implying that
the FARC had been following her.  Although the translation or
transcription of Espinosa-Cortez’s testimony on this point could
be clearer,  it is evident that Espinosa-Cortez rejected the3
FARC’s demands in no uncertain terms:
They wanted me, me to be an informant.  And that
we stop providing for the army and work with
them and they needed—that they wanted part of
  The underlined portion of the testimony quoted here4
appears to contain an error in translation or transcription, in that
the first word clearly should be “I,” not “they.”  It makes little
sense for the FARC to have informed Espinosa-Cortez that he
would not inform for them because they go against his
principles—obviously, Espinosa-Cortez said this to the caller,
not the reverse.  This reading is supported by the next sentence,
which explains why “at no time” would Espinosa inform for the
FARC.  As we explain below, however, whether or not this
portion of Espinosa-Cortez’s testimony was mistranslated is
immaterial to our analysis. 
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the money that I had, that I made.  They just
stated that no moment would I accept because
they go against my principles.  At, at no time
because with the experience that I had my hatred
of them was complete and I, I wanted them to be
enemies.
(Id. at 138 (emphasis added.))  4
Prior to the November 2002 telephone call, Espinosa-
Cortez had informed neither his wife nor the police of the prior
threats.  After that call, however, he “went into a panic” and
informed his wife of the telephone calls.  (Id. at 134.)  He also
spoke to his friends in the military, who advised him that there
was nothing to be done and that he should change his daily
routine.  In December 2002, he found on the windshield of his
car a drawing of the route he took when driving to the military
academy, which he understood to be an indication of the fact
that he was being followed by the FARC.  At this point,
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Espinosa-Cortez went to the military unit called Grupos de
Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal (“GAULA”), which
is a specialized anti-kidnapping unit of the Colombian military.
GAULA informed him that cases older than his took priority and
that, in effect, nothing could be done to protect him or his
family.
In February 2003, Espinosa-Cortez received a final call
from the FARC in which the caller demanded that he work as an
informant and “cooperate with them in every sense.”  (Id. at
136.)  Subsequently, in May 2003, two well-dressed men
approached Ximena on the street on her way home from school.
The men told her to relay the message to her father that they
were “not playing.”  (Id. at 156.)  Alarmed by the fact that the
FARC had escalated from making telephone calls to Espinosa-
Cortez to making personal contact with Ximena, the family
decided that they had to leave Colombia.  They quickly
liquidated their assets and flew to the United States, the only
country where the three already had tourist visas. 
B.
Shortly after their arrival in the United States, Espinosa-
Cortez and Ximena filed separate petitions for asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief; Espinosa-Cortez’s
application was filed on behalf of himself and his wife.  The
hearings on the two petitions were consolidated, as the factual
basis for Ximena’s application is identical to that underlying her
parents’ application.  
The IJ denied the applications.  As we noted, supra, the
IJ found that Espinosa-Cortez’s testimony concerning the
FARC’s pursuit of him to become their informant was credible,
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but she did not find his testimony concerning his Liberal Party
campaign activities to be credible.  The IJ concluded that
Espinosa-Cortez’s treatment by the FARC did not amount to
past persecution on account of his political opinions, because (1)
the 1984 kidnapping was motivated by money, not politics; and
(2) the FARC’s threats were not sufficiently imminent to
constitute persecution.  
The IJ further concluded that Petitioners had not
demonstrated that they have a well-founded fear of future
persecution on account of Espinosa-Cortez’s actual or imputed
political beliefs.  The IJ observed that the FARC seeks to
destabilize the country as a whole—she noted that “everyone
from the president on down is under threat from FARC,” (id. at
76)—and that generalized civil unrest does not constitute
persecution.  With regard to the threats that were levied at
Petitioners in particular, the IJ concluded that there was no
nexus between these threats and Espinosa-Cortez’s actual or
imputed political beliefs because “respondent’s own political
activity is very scanty.”  (Id. at 77.)  Instead, the IJ concluded
that Espinosa-Cortez had been threatened because of his social
and professional ties to the government, not his political beliefs:
Almost all the evidence reflects [that] FARC’s
motivation to recruit respondent as an informant
was based on his commercial and social ties to
police, military and government officials, and his
access to these groups through his catering
business.  FARC does view the respondent as
potentially useful to their goal, but did not deem
him politically offensive.
  Since an applicant’s burden of proof for withholding of5
removal is higher than that for asylum, the IJ determined that the
Petitioners were ineligible for withholding of removal.  The IJ
likewise denied their applications for relief under the CAT,
since it was not the Colombian government that threatened to
harm Petitioners.  Espinosa-Cortez does not appeal these two
rulings.  
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(Id. at 78-79.)  Having found that the persecution Espinosa-
Cortez faced was not on account of his political beliefs, the IJ
concluded that he was ineligible for asylum.   5
Espinosa-Cortez appealed the IJ’s ruling to the BIA,
which affirmed.  The BIA reasoned as follows:
[T]he respondent did not demonstrate that the
FARC was motivated to threaten him by any
political opinion imputed to him or because of his
prior support and participation in mayoral
campaigns on behalf of the Liberal Party.  The
respondent did not adequately show that his
political opinion played any significant role in his
business connections with the military.  Nor did
he sufficiently show that the FARC would view
him as a political supporter of the government if
he did not serve as an informant . . . . Thus, while
the lead respondent claims that the FARC
attributed a political opinion to him based on his
strong connections with the Colombian
government and that his refusal to cooperate was
perceived as an intention to support the
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government, the evidence of record does not
adequately support his claim.  See I.N.S. v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992).
(App. at  3.)  The BIA likewise affirmed the IJ’s denial of
Espinosa-Cortez’s application for withholding of removal and
CAT relief, see Note 5, supra, and rejected Espinosa-Cortez’s
argument that inadequate translation and transcription affected
the fairness of the proceedings, see Note 3, supra.  Espinosa-
Cortez thereafter filed this timely petition for review of the
BIA’s decision.  
II.
A.
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  “Because the BIA issued an
opinion, rather than a summary affirmance, we review the BIA’s
(rather than the IJ’s) decision.”  Rranci v. Att’y Gen., 540 F.3d
165, 171 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157,
162 (3d Cir. 2005)).  
Our review of the BIA’s denial of Petitioners’ asylum
application is highly deferential.  “We affirm any findings of
fact supported by substantial evidence and are ‘bound by the
administrative findings of fact unless a reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to arrive at a contrary conclusion.’”
Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Yan Lan Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 421 (3d Cir.
2005)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative
findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”).  Whether, for
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asylum purposes, a petitioner has proven that he or she has a
well-founded fear of persecution “is a question of fact, and the
agency determination must be upheld if it is supported by
‘substantial evidence’ in the record.”  Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y
Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 340 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Lukwago v.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2003)).  We have,
however, emphasized that “the requirement that the BIA’s
decision be supported by substantial evidence is not an empty
one.”  Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 517 (3d Cir. 2006).
“[D]eference is not due where findings and conclusions are
based on inferences or presumptions that are not reasonably
grounded in  the record, viewed as a whole,”
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 502 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir.
2007) (citation omitted), and the BIA is not permitted simply to
ignore or misconstrue evidence in the asylum applicant’s favor.
See, e.g., Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 519; BinRashed v. Gonzales,
502 F.3d 666, 673 (7th Cir. 2007).
B.
Espinosa-Cortez contends that the BIA’s decision that he
lacked a reasonable fear of future persecution on account of his
actual or imputed political beliefs is not supported by substantial
evidence in the record.  In particular, he argues that the BIA
employed too narrow an understanding of what constitutes a
political opinion, and that the BIA overlooked the significance
of his close ties to the Colombian government in concluding that
he had not been targeted because of an imputed political
opinion.  We review the law that governs Espinosa-Cortez’s
asylum claim and address the merits of his petition for review in
turn below.  
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1.
“The Attorney General has the discretion to grant asylum
to any alien who ‘is a refugee within the meaning of section
1101(a)(42)(A)’” of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”).  Camara, 580 F.3d at 201 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1)(A)).  The INA defines the term “refugee” as follows:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such
person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling
to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  
Under the terms of this provision, Espinosa-Cortez may
show that he is eligible for asylum by proving either that he was
previously persecuted on account of a statutorily enumerated
ground, or that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution
on account of a statutorily enumerated ground.  Persecution
“includes, but is not limited to, ‘threats to life, confinement,
torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute
a threat to life or freedom.’”  Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 340
(quoting Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2008)).
An asylum applicant who establishes that he or she was
previously persecuted on account of a statutorily enumerated
ground triggers a rebuttable presumption that the applicant has
a well-founded fear of future persecution.  See Lukwago, 329
F.3d at 174 (citation omitted).  
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An asylum applicant who cannot establish past
persecution does not enjoy the benefit of such a presumption but
may still demonstrate eligibility for asylum by establishing that
he or she has a well-founded fear of future persecution.  In order
to show that a fear of future persecution is “well-founded,” 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), a petitioner must demonstrate that his
or her “fear is both subjective[ly] and objectively reasonable,
which [he or] she may do by using testimonial, documentary, or
expert evidence.”  Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 346 (internal
citations omitted).  In order to satisfy the subjective prong of
this inquiry, the petitioner must show “that the fear is genuine.”
Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted).  To satisfy the objective prong, the petitioner must
show that “a reasonable person in the alien’s circumstances
would fear persecution if returned to the country in question.”
Id. (citation omitted).  
However, “an applicant for asylum need not prove that
the persecution he or she suffered (or fears suffering in the
future) occurred solely on account [of] one of the five grounds
enumerated in the INA.”  Singh v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 191, 197
(3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).  Rather, the applicant must
only demonstrate that the protected ground constitutes “at least
one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”  8 U.S.C. §
1108(b)(1)(B)(I).  The asylum applicant bears the burden of
proving eligibility for asylum, and “[t]estimony, by itself, is
sufficient to meet this burden, if credible.”  Singh, 406 F.3d at
195 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
2.
Turning to the merits of the instant petition for review,
  The General Counsel of the Immigration and6
Naturalization Service (“INS”) recognized as early as 1993 that
an imputed political opinion is an acceptable basis for an asylum
claim.  See INS General Counsel Legal Opinion (January 19,
1993), reprinted in 70 Interpreter Releases 498.
-15-
we conclude that the BIA’s determination that the FARC did not
target Espinosa-Cortez on account of a political opinion it
imputed to him is not supported by substantial evidence in the
record.  We have long recognized that a person can be eligible
for asylum if he faces the prospect of persecution on account of
imputed, as well as actual, political beliefs.  See, e.g., Lukwago,
329 F.3d at 181 (“[P]ersecution may be on account of a political
opinion the applicant actually holds or on account of one the
[persecutor] has imputed to him.”) (citation omitted).  The
majority of our sister circuits have likewise held that “an alien
may base a persecution claim on imputed political opinion.”6
Chen v. Holder, --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 1688491, at *5 (7th Cir.
Apr. 28, 2010); accord Haider v. Holder, 595 F.3d 276, 285 (6th
Cir. 2010); Marroquin-Ochoma v. Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 577
(8th Cir. 2009); Singh v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008);
Delgado v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 2007); Rivera
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 487 F.3d 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2007);
Cordon-Garcia v. I.N.S., 204 F.3d 985, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2000).
In determining whether an asylum applicant was
persecuted because of an imputed political opinion, we focus on
whether “the persecutor attributed a political opinion to the
victim, and acted upon the attribution.”  Amanfi v. Ashcroft,
328 F.3d 719, 729 n.4 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).  This
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focus on whether the persecutor (or would-be persecutor)
attributes a political view to the victim makes clear that “the
INA ‘makes motive critical’ and an asylum applicant must
provide ‘some evidence of [motive], direct or circumstantial.’”
Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 343 (quoting Elias-Zacarias, 502
U.S. at 483).  Although cognizant of this emphasis upon a
persecutor’s motive, the Courts of Appeals have at the same
time recognized that “it would be patently absurd to expect an
applicant . . . to produce [] documentary evidence” of a
persecutor’s motives, Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 521 (quotation
marks and citations omitted), since “persecutors are hardly likely
to submit declarations explaining exactly what motivated them
to act.”  Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 742 (9th Cir.
2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  Accordingly, in
certain cases, “the factual circumstances alone may constitute
sufficient circumstantial evidence of a persecutor’s . . .
motives.”  Canales-Vargas v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 739, 744 (9th
Cir. 2006) (further explaining that “circumstantial evidence of
motive may include, inter alia, the timing of the persecution and
signs or emblems left at the site of persecution”) (quotation
marks and citations omitted); see also Chavarria, 446 F.3d at
521.  
In finding that Espinosa-Cortez failed to establish that
FARC’s motives for  pursuing him related to actual or imputed
political beliefs, the BIA relied almost exclusively upon the
Supreme Court’s decision in Elias-Zacarias; in defending the
BIA’s decision, the Government likewise rests heavily upon
Elias-Zacarias.  Owing to its importance in this case, therefore,
a detailed review of that decision is in order.  
In Elias-Zacarias, the petitioner was a young man from
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Guatemala who was approached by guerrillas and urged to join
their movement.  502 U.S. at 479.  The petitioner resisted this
attempt at recruitment because, according to his testimony, “the
guerrillas are against the government and he was afraid that the
government would retaliate against him and his family if he did
join the guerrillas.”  Id. at 480.  The IJ and the BIA concluded
that the guerrillas’ attempted recruitment did not constitute
persecution on account of the petitioner’s political beliefs, but
the Ninth Circuit “ruled that acts of conscription by a
nongovernmental group constitute persecution on account of
political opinion, and determined that Elias-Zacarias had a
‘well-founded fear’ of such conscription.”  Id. 
The Supreme Court reversed.  As the Court explained,
Elias-Zacarias had not only failed to demonstrate that he resisted
the recruitment efforts on account of his political beliefs, but his
testimony revealed just the opposite to be true—that he resisted
out of fear of governmental retaliation (which is not a political
opinion):
Even a person who supports a guerrilla movement
might resist recruitment for a variety of
reasons—fear of combat, a desire to remain with
one’s family and friends, a desire to earn a better
living in civilian life, to mention only a few.  The
record in the present case not only failed to show
a political motive on Elias-Zacarias’ part; it
showed the opposite.  He testified that he refused
to join the guerrillas because he was afraid that
the government would retaliate against him and
his family if he did so.  Nor is there any indication
(assuming, arguendo, it would suffice) that the
  It bears repeating, however, that evidence of the7
persecutor’s motive may be—and, for practical purposes, will
necessarily be—circumstantial, not direct.  See Chavarria, 446
F.3d at 521 (noting that “persecutors are hardly likely to provide
their victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of
-18-
g u e r r i l l a s  e r ro n e o u s ly b e l ie v e d  th a t
Elias-Zacarias’ refusal was politically based.
Id. at 482.  The Court likewise rejected the petitioner’s
suggestion that the guerrillas would automatically construe his
resistance to their recruitment efforts as being political in nature.
The Court explained that such resistance could just as easily be
explained by “indifference, indecisiveness, and risk averseness,”
and that Elias-Zacarias had failed to present any evidence “that
the guerrillas [would] persecute him because of [his] political
opinion, rather than because of his refusal to fight with them.”
Id. at 483.  
The BIA more or less treated Elias-Zacarias as
dispositive of Espinosa-Cortez’s asylum claim, and the
Government urges that we do the same.  As the BIA concluded
and the Government argues, there are certain obvious
similarities between this case and Elias-Zacarias.  As in Elias-
Zacarias, Espinosa-Cortez was subjected to an effort at
recruitment by a guerrilla organization, and, as in our case, the
attempted recruitment in Elias-Zacarias was accompanied by
threats.  See id. at 480.  And, as was true in Elias-Zacarias,
Espinosa-Cortez produced no direct evidence that the guerrillas
targeted him, at least in part, on account of their perception of
his political views.   Id. at 483.  At first blush, then, the7
persecution”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).  A
petitioner is not required to produce direct evidence of a
persecutor’s motive, but is instead permitted to rely upon
circumstantial evidence.  See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84.
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similarities between the two cases lend some support to the
BIA’s rejection of Espinosa-Cortez’s asylum claim.  
There are, however, important factual distinctions
between Elias-Zacarias and this case that the BIA did not
consider.  These factual distinctions lead us to conclude that “a
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled” to find that the
FARC’s pursuit of Espinosa-Cortez stemmed, at least in part,
from a political opinion it imputed to him.  Camara, 580 F.3d at
201 (citation omitted).  Elias-Zacarias, in other words, is not
dispositive of Espinosa-Cortez’s claim, and the BIA overlooked
the significance of certain critical facts in the record that clearly
distinguish Espinosa-Cortez’s case from Elias-Zacarias.  
The first such fact is Espinosa-Cortez’s close, direct
affiliation with, and support of, the Colombian government and
military.  Quite unlike the record in Elias-Zacarias, in which
there was no suggestion whatsoever that the petitioner had any
ties to the Guatemalan government, Espinosa-Cortez made his
living by supporting the Colombian government, military, and
military academy through the provision of food and other
services.  Although we have not made the point expressly, the
Ninth Circuit has long “found persecution of those who work for
or with political figures to be on account of the political opinion
of their employer even if the nature of their work for or with that
person is not in itself political.”  Navas v. I.N.S., 217 F.3d 646,
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659 n.19 (9th Cir. 2000); accord Sagaydak v. Gonzales, 405
F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Viktor was aligned with the
political opinion of his employer simply by the fact that he
worked as a government official enforcing government
policies.”); Cordon-Garcia, 204 F.3d at 992 (Where a teacher
taught literacy classes for a government-funded organization,
her “presumed affiliation with the Guatemalan government—an
entity the guerrillas oppose—is the functional equivalent of a
conclusion that she holds a political opinion opposite to that of
the guerrillas, whether or not she actually holds such an
opinion.”) (quotation marks omitted); Velarde v. INS, 140 F.3d
1305, 1312 (9th Cir. 1998).
Cordon-Garcia is instructive on this point and highly
relevant to our case.  The petitioner in that case worked for
CONALFA, a government-funded literacy agency in Guatemala.
Cordon-Garcia, 204 F.3d at 988.  She was approached by a
guerrilla who, like the FARC agents in our case, informed her
“that the guerrillas wanted her to work for them instead of for
CONALFA.”  Id. at 989.  The guerrilla informed the petitioner
that the guerrillas opposed her literacy work, threatened her, and
told her that she would have to “decide which one you’re going
to work with.”  Id.  The petitioner fled to the United States and
applied for asylum; the IJ rejected her asylum claim and the BIA
affirmed.
The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review, holding
that Cordon-Garcia had been persecuted on account of a pro-
government political opinion that the guerrillas had imputed to
her by virtue of her employment with a government-funded
organization.  As the court explained, “[a]bsent her affiliation
with the government and its push for literacy among
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Guatemalans, Petitioner likely would not have come to the
guerrillas’ attention.”  Id. at 992.  In an analysis that is directly
applicable to Espinosa-Cortez’s asylum claim, the Court
observed that
Petitioner’s “presumed affiliation” with the
Guatemalan government—an entity the guerrillas
oppose—is the functional equivalent of a
conclusion that she holds a political opinion
opposite to that of the guerrillas, whether or not
she actually holds such an opinion.  This is the
crux of the idea covered by the doctrine of
“imputed political opinion” in refugee and asylum
law.  Accordingly, we hold that any reasonable
factfinder would have to conclude that Petitioner
suffered persecution, at least in part, due to this
imputed political opinion.
According to the BIA, Petitioner’s experiences
resulted from “attempted recruitment,”
“displeasure with the respondent’s profession,”
and nothing more than “the general strategy of the
Guatemalan guerrillas to create civil disorder.”
These descriptions are not borne out by the record
in this case.  Petitioner plainly suffered this
experience specifically because of her affiliation
with the government . . . . Each of the BIA’s
attempts to nullify the political overtones of
Petitioner’s experiences overlooks both the fact
that she was affiliated with the government and
the obvious inference that her continued teaching
meant opposition to the guerrillas’ goals.
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Id. at 992 (internal citations omitted).  
We agree with this analysis, and, as was the case in
Cordon-Garcia, we believe that a reasonable factfinder would be
compelled to conclude that the political opinions that the
guerrillas imputed to Espinosa-Cortez were “at least one central
reason” for the FARC’s threats.  8 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1)(B)(I).
As was true in Cordon-Garcia, Espinosa-Cortez was not directly
employed by the Colombian government, but he was closely
affiliated with the government, provided support to the
government, and he depended upon the government for his
livelihood.  Id. at 988.  And as in Cordon-Garcia, it was
exclusively Espinosa-Cortez’s affiliation with, and access to, the
Colombian government and military that brought him “to the
guerrillas’ attention” in the first place.  Id. at 992.  There is
absolutely no suggestion from the record that the FARC would
have pursued Espinosa-Cortez to become an informant if he had
not been so closely associated with the government and military,
and, indeed, the entirety of the evidence is to the contrary.  To
conclude, as the BIA did, that there was “no political link to the
FARC’s threats,” (App. at 3), would require either that one turn
a blind eye to the factual circumstances surrounding the FARC’s
pursuit of Espinosa-Cortez, or that one adopt an impermissibly
narrow construction of the term “political opinion.”  See
Delgado v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 2007) (being
pro-government and anti-FARC is a political opinion for asylum
purposes).  
Indeed, as Espinosa-Cortez argues, we have determined
that the BIA erred in failing to impute political opinions under
more tenuous circumstances than those presented in this case.
In Chavarria, the petitioner “was essentially apolitical,” but,
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acting as a good Samaritan, he came to the aid of two women
who were being attacked by government-sponsored
paramilitaries in Guatemala.  Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 513.  The
two women, it turns out, were members of CONAVIGUA, an
anti-government human rights organization, and the petitioner
was subsequently followed and threatened by the paramilitaries
who had attacked the women.  Id.  We held that Chavarria’s fear
was “clearly on account of an imputed political opinion” and
rejected the IJ’s and BIA’s determinations to the contrary,
finding that the agency’s conclusions were not supported by
substantial evidence.  Id. at 521.  We explained:
Here, Chavarria testified that, before the first
incident with the CONAVIGUA women, he was
essentially apolitical.  As we noted earlier, he then
offered substantial and compelling testimony that
after the incident he was put under surveillance by
the same men who perpetrated the attack on the
CONAVIGUA women.  There is no evidence
casting any doubt on this testimony, and we think
it clear that the paramilitaries targeted Chavarria
because they ascribed to him an association with
the CONAVIGUA group that, at minimum, could
be anti-government sympathies.
Id.  It goes without saying that Espinosa-Cortez’s long-term
affiliation with, and support of, the Colombian government was
much more significant than was Chavarria’s fleeting association
  Moreover, in suggesting that Espinosa-Cortez was8
required to “show that his political opinion played [a] significant
role in his business connections with the military” in order to
prove that the FARC imputed a pro-government, anti-FARC
opinion to him, the BIA misstated the premise of an imputed
political opinion.  (App. at 3.)  At the root of the concept of
persecution on account of imputed political opinion is the fact
that “persecution may be on account of a political opinion the
applicant actually holds or on account of one the [persecutor]
has imputed to him.”  Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 181 (citation
omitted).  Espinosa-Cortez was not required to prove that his
business connections with the government resulted from a
political opinion he held in order to show that the FARC
imputed a political opinion to him based upon his close ties to
the government.  See Cordon-Garcia, 204 F.3d at 992.
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with two members of the CONAVIGUA group.   In short, the8
BIA overlooked the obvious political overtones in the FARC’s
pursuit of Espinosa-Cortez, who would have been of no interest
to the guerrillas but for his long-standing, close association with
the Colombian government.  Cordon-Garcia, 204 F.3d at 992.
There are two additional significant facts, overlooked by
the IJ and the BIA, that distinguish this case from Elias-
Zacarias.  First, unlike the petitioner in Elias-Zacarias, Espinosa-
Cortez engaged in protracted resistance to the FARC’s
recruitment efforts.  In Elias-Zacarias, the petitioner was
approached by guerrillas on a single occasion; Elias-Zacarias
refused their single effort at recruitment (without, apparently,
expressing any political views) and fled to the United States.
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See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 479-80.  By contrast, in this
case, the Espinosa-Cortez family was approached by the FARC
on multiple occasions, including the occasion in which the
FARC agents approached Ximena on the street, and Espinosa-
Cortez was repeatedly asked to serve as an informant and to
cease providing food to the military.  Second (and more
importantly), although the translation of his testimony could be
clearer, it is apparent that Espinosa-Cortez, unlike Elias-
Zacarias, made his anti-FARC views known to his persecutors
in rejecting their advances.  In describing one of his exchanges
with a FARC caller, Espinosa-Cortez testified as follows: “They
just stated that no moment would I accept because they go
against my principles.  At, at no time because with the
experience that I had my hatred of them was complete and I, I
wanted them to be enemies.”  (App. at 138.)  
There are two possible ways to interpret the first of these
sentences: either that Espinosa-Cortez stated directly to his
FARC pursuer that he would not inform for them because the
FARC went against his principles, or that a member of the
FARC stated to Espinosa-Cortez that Espinosa-Cortez would not
join the FARC because the FARC went against his principles.
Under either interpretation, the significant point is that
Espinosa-Cortez’s testimony demonstrates unmistakably that the
FARC was aware that Espinosa-Cortez’s refusal to work for the
guerrillas stemmed from his anti-FARC principles.  Unlike in
Elias-Zacarias, where it was unclear whether the petitioner’s
resistance to the guerrillas was motivated by political beliefs or
“indifference, indecisiveness, and risk averseness,”
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483, in this case we know (and, more
importantly, the FARC knew) that Espinosa-Cortez’s resistance
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was motivated at least in part by his anti-FARC sentiment.  The
guerrillas’ continued threats in the face of Espinosa-Cortez’s
stated opposition to the FARC demonstrate a close nexus
between the FARC’s threats and Espinosa-Cortez’s political
opinions that was absent in Elias-Zacarias.  
In this respect, even if the BIA concluded that Espinosa-
Cortez was not initially targeted on account of imputed political
beliefs (a conclusion that, as we noted above, is undermined by
the principles of Cordon-Garcia), he was eventually threatened,
at least in part, on account of his political beliefs.  That is, a
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude that the
FARC, by threatening a government-affiliated person after that
person made his anti-FARC views known, had threatened
persecution at least in part on account of the victim’s political
beliefs.  As the Second Circuit has explained:
[P]ersecution on account of one ground [does not]
preclude[] a well-grounded fear of future
persecution on account of another. [The
petitioner] did testify, as the BIA emphasized, that
the FARC [initially] targeted her because of her
knowledge of her computers, a reason unrelated
to political opinion.  But she also testified that she
would be targeted by the FARC in the future for
betraying them, which, when coupled with the
government’s unwillingness to control the FARC,
could well qualify as persecution for an imputed
political opinion (opposition to the FARC). 
Delgado, 508 F.3d at 706-07.  Threatening a person with death
for not collaborating with the FARC, after the recipient of the
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threat made clear that his refusal was “because they go against
[his] principles,” is persecution on account of political beliefs.
(App. at 138.)  
Although our review of the BIA’s conclusion that a
person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution is
deferential, the BIA may not simply overlook evidence in the
record that supports the applicant’s case.  See BinRashed, 502
F.3d at 673; see also Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 502 F.3d at 289;
Mema v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An
applicant for asylum is entitled to a reasoned analysis, not one
which wholly disregards relevant, probative evidence.”).  In this
case, the BIA overlooked the inescapable political overtones in
the FARC’s pursuit of Espinosa-Cortez, and it completely
disregarded evidence showing that the FARC knew of Espinosa-
Cortez’s anti-FARC principles, even as the guerrillas threatened
him for not betraying those principles.  Under these
circumstances, a reasonable factfinder would be compelled to
conclude that the threats levied by the FARC were motivated, at
least in part, by a political opinion the FARC imputed to
Espinosa-Cortez.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
In granting Espinosa-Cortez’s petition, we do not hold
that any person affiliated with a foreign government who is
threatened by an anti-government organization has necessarily
been threatened on the basis of imputed political opinion.  In
this case, Espinosa-Cortez (1) testified about his long-term
association with the Colombian government and military, (2)
made his living by providing support to those institutions, (3)
would not have come to the guerrillas’ attention but for his
relationship with the government and military, (4) rebuffed
repeated overtures from the FARC to join with them, and (5)
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expressly made his anti-FARC opinions known to the FARC
agents attempting to recruit him.  Under these circumstances, the
BIA’s conclusion that the FARC’s threats were not centrally
motivated by a political opinion the guerrillas imputed to
Espinosa-Cortez is not supported by substantial evidence in the
record.  
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the petition for
review.  
